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Abstract1 
 
Using Hungarian case law, this essay first explores the singular 
potential in the anti-discrimination legal concept of ‘harassment’, as it 
is perceived under EU law, to tackle institutional discrimination. 
Following this, the author turns to the risks and limitations of the 
practical operationalization of institutional discrimination in human 
rights litigation, as well as the uniqueness and subsequent challenges 
the subjectified standards of evidence for harassment may pose for 
due process/fair trial, as demonstrated by harassment cases in 
American universities. 
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This essay is structured as follows: After proposing a set of definitions concerning 
‘structural inequalities’, ‘structural discrimination’, ‘institutional and institutionalized 
discrimination’ and ‘harassment’, I turn to exploring the unique potential in the anti-
discrimination legal concept of ‘harassment,’ as it is perceived under EU law, to tackle 
the phenomenon of institutional discrimination, that is, exclusion rooted in 
institutional culture, or operational patterns. I will argue that the peculiarity of 
‘harassment’ is that it is focused on the existence of an ‘intimidating, hostile, 
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment’, but it does not require a comparator 
and it allows entire organizations or subunits to be sanctioned along with individuals. 
Using Hungarian case law (NGO actio popularis litigation), I will show that the 
flexibility of anti-discrimination law, its unique terminology and conceptualization 
enables an activist interpretation to broaden its scope to cover novel, subtle and 
complex inequalities and grievances such as police raids, ethnic profiling, banning 
pride events and even hate speech. The cases cover a broad range of discrimination in 
terms of grounds and protected characteristics. 
The second part of the article investigates the conceptual complexity, as well as 
the limitations and risks involved with the concept of harassment. While arguing that it 
indeed can be a silver bullet to tackle institutional discrimination, I will argue that it is 
no panacea for all forms of discrimination and social injustice: not every form of 
institutional discrimination can be conceptualized as harassment, not every form of 
discriminatory harassment will lead to institutional discrimination, and not every form 
of harassment amounts to discrimination. 
A separate discussion is focused on the conceptual and procedural features of 
harassment, pointing out that legal standards relying solely on the subjective feeling of 
the complainant in regards of an intimidating and humiliating environment are not 
without risk. While it is a powerful and empowering tool for victims and members of 
marginalized communities, it can lead to lawlessness if there are no constraints to 
sanctioning based on declarations of feelings. Hence, if a petitioner can assume 
standing, that is, a protected personality trait or characteristic (for which in several 
instances of anti-discrimination legislation there is an open-ended list) it is a daunting 
task for the judiciary and equality bodies to set up standards and due process/fair trial 
guarantees. 
Pointing to the confusing feature of harassment which blends discriminatory, 
criminal and labor law transgressions, the article discusses the specific case of a 
gender-based (sexual) discrimination in the #MeToo-era in this context, with a special 
focus on American higher education cases, which are arguably the frontline for 
(sexual) harassment cases. 
The article concludes that no systemic concerns have been raised in regards of 
harassment charges applied in regards of other protected characteristics. Sexual 
harassment related occasional backlashes dominate, if not monopolize public 
discussion and both shift the attention from other forms of harassment, and reduce 
and misguide the perception of harassment, a truly unique analytic concept and a legal 
term which binds dignity, equality and identity claims in a complex and unique 
fashion, able to sanction simultaneously discrimination, employment law and criminal 
transgressions. The article also adds that the complexity of harassment may prove to 
be its self-limiting weakness, as if direct or indirect discrimination can be argued in a 
case, counsels would likely have it easier with any judge going down those roads. 
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1. Institutional, institutionalized and structural discrimination,  
and harassment: terms and definitions 
 
Before turning to the analysis of the intricacies of the legal concept of harassment and 
its potential to offer remedies for various forms of social injustice, an exploration of 
terminology is in place. 
In social science literature, there are dozens of definitions for conceptualizing 
structural inequalities, marginalization, discrimination, etc. This assessment focuses on 
law and legal conceptualization and terminology. Structural discrimination is the most 
general phenomenon or process, and it is also the one least feasible to encapsulate in 
legal terms. Hence, structural discrimination is not a legal term, it is used in social 
sciences to describe general, systematic forms of exclusion that goes beyond the actual 
workings of individual organizations and institutions. It calls attention to the fact that 
exclusion is based on forms of social communication, constant and recurrent habits 
and patterns that appear in the shape of attitudes, norms, value systems and choices 
that result in the exclusion and systematic disfavoring of certain groups. It does not 
require intentional behavior, fault or intent, and might not even be apparent in formal 
rules of social institutions. Consider segregated housing, the negative and biased 
media representation of minorities, the low number of women in political bodies or 
senior positions in the business world or academia.  
Moving to ‘institutional’ and ‘institutionalized’ discrimination, which I use as 
synonyms, several definitions are available in the literature, but so far there has been 
no conclusive, generally acceptable theoretical and analytical differentiation between 
the two terms. Dovidio (2010) emphasizes that institutional discrimination is a rule, a 
convention or practice that systematically represents and reproduces group-based 
inequality. McCrudden (1982) argues that the gist of the phenomenon is that 
exclusion has become so institutionalized that there is no further need for individual 
decisions and actions to make an institution’s operation effectively exclusive. The 
point is that due to operational mechanisms, the system itself discriminates, and there 
is no need for specific decisions for exclusion, intention or bias. According to Haney-
López (1999: 1717), and what has been termed as new institutionalism, a trend that 
goes beyond the rational choice theory of institutional sociology, institutional 
discrimination is a practice that directly or indirectly confirms the social status of 
disadvantaged groups, and ‘institutions’ are not necessarily organizations, but can be 
social practices, as well. 
In the social sciences conceptualization institutional discrimination is simply 
used as a synonym for structural or institutionalized racism. For the purposes of this 
essay, the most important aspect of institutionalized discrimination is that it is not 
necessarily a result of deliberate discriminatory procedures or attitudes, but that of an 
institutional culture, an operational pattern that in effect disfavors certain social 
groups. 
As for harassment: it is a truly unique concept in law. It may refer to a wide 
variety of behavior which can be sanctioned both by civil and criminal law. Criminal 
harassment usually entails targeting someone else with behavior which causes alarm or 
distress, or what is meant to alarm, annoy, torment or terrorize, and creating 
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reasonable fear in the victim for their or their family’s safety. Commonly referred to as 
stalking, criminal harassment may include the repeated following of a person, or 
communication in a way that could arouse fear. Criminal harassment also includes 
uttering threats. 
But harassment is also part of the anti-discrimination legislation. Anti-
discrimination law habitually relies on the distinction between direct and indirect 
discrimination. Consider for example the EU’s Race Directive: 
Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less 
favorably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable 
situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin; indirect discrimination shall be 
taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice 
would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage 
compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is 
objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary. (Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin) 
 
Although strictly speaking no actual disparate treatment is taking place, in order to 
broaden the concept of discrimination, harassment is usually also included within the 
legal conceptualization. According to the aforementioned EU Directive, ‘harassment 
shall be deemed to be discrimination […] when […] conduct related to racial or ethnic 
origin takes place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of 
creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.’ 
Thus, harassment is a distinct type of discrimination. Its gist is that the harasser 
creates or tolerates an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating, offending 
environment that violates the human dignity of the victim. The phenomena of 
mobbing (harassment at the workplace) and bullying (used in connection to school 
and educational environments) are also recognized as such. One of the distinctive and 
most important features of harassment is that it is (also) the employer or a 
(representative of a) collective entity that can be held responsible for providing a 
harassment-free environment or procedure, thus it is not (only) individuals, such as 
police officers or employees, who can engage in this form of discrimination, but the 
employer, and even an entire organization as well. 
There is also a third dimension how harassment surfaces, and due to its 
massive media representation and presence in public discourse, one of such areas will 
be in the center of the last section of this essay: when employers conduct disciplinary 
proceedings against employees or terminate contracts based on allegations of various 
forms of sexual harassment, following internal guidelines or policy decisions that are 
only indirectly connected to or based on legislative frameworks. These cases will not 
involve institutional discrimination directly, but it arguably involves systematic 
tolerance (and even encouragement) of certain conduct and a pervasive corporate 
culture which can be seen as form of institutional discrimination. 
Harassment can be both a one-time occurrence and a pattern of procedures, or 
a series of continuous, recurring activities. Its corollary feature is that it does not 
assume an individual intention, guilt or prejudice and does not (or does not only) 
sanction the behavior of actual harassers or individuals participating in these 
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procedures, but the organization, the unit or the whole institution that allows for an 
intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. 
 
2. Operationalizing institutional discrimination as harassment 
 
The following pages turn to demonstrating the unique potential in the anti-
discrimination legal concept of ‘harassment,’ as it is perceived under EU law, to tackle 
the phenomenon of institutional discrimination. To accentuate the peculiarity of 
‘harassment’: it is focused on the existence/creation/tolerance of an ‘intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment’, but it does not require a 
comparator (direct discrimination is defined as unfavourable by comparison to 
someone in a similar situation), and it allows entire organizations or subunits to be 
sanctioned along individuals. Using Hungarian case law built on NGO actio popularis 
litigation, I will show how an activist interpretation to broaden the scope of harassment 
to cover police raids, ethnic profiling, administrative bigotry, such as banning pride 
events, and even hate speech may open novel avenues for human rights litigation, 
even tackling cases where no other legal remedies would be available. Arguably, the 
extraordinary potential and these litigation strategies are exportable throughout the 
Europe (and maybe even beyond), and can be used as a silver bullet. 
In the following I will cite a few cases where Hungarian human rights NGOs 
convincingly used harassment at some point in litigation to for example combat ethnic 
profiling and hate speech by local politicians: in all cases where no alternative 
argument for legal remedy was available. Again, let us be reminded that a defining 
element of institutional discrimination is that it concerns the aggregate effect of 
formally legal actions and procedures. 
In a 2011 case launched before Hungary’s equality body (EBH/865/2011), the 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC) successfully argued that in the village of 
Rimóc (in Northern Hungary), 97 per cent of the 150 bikers stopped and penalized 
for the lack of bicycle accessories between 1 January and 5 September, 2011 were 
Roma (Helsinki, 2012). The case ended in a settlement between the Nógrád County 
Police Headquarters and the HHC. A similar project was launched in 2016 targeting 
the Budapest Metropolitan Police’s stop and search practices concerning 400 
homeless people (EBH/17/2016). Here too, settlement negotiations and an 
agreement was concluded, police undertook to issue a memorandum declaring that it 
is discriminatory to carry out general identity checks of homeless and socially 
disadvantaged people.  
A series of complex raids on Roma in the northern city of Miskolc triggered 
considerable attention. Various Hungarian and European NGOs and authorities 
conducted a complex investigation of the practice of coordinated raids by the police 
the city health and social departments, child protection services, and the water and gas 
suppliers in the segregated areas of the city in between 15 April 2013 and 17 April 
2014 involving more than 2700 properties and approximately 4500 people, examining 
residency documentation, livestock conditions, sanitation, etc. (AJB-1474/2014). 
According to the ombudsman and his deputy in charge of nationalities (minorities), 
the high security inspections lacked appropriate constitutional reasons and posed an 
unnecessary and disproportionate restriction on the right to privacy of the inspected 
people who were mainly socially disadvantaged and Roma. The reoccurring 
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inspections were focused on the segregated areas of Miskolc and were held to lead to 
direct discrimination based on social origin and financial status and indirect 
discrimination based on ethnic origin, as well as the style of communication of the 
inspectors was found to be offensive, abusive and humiliating. Although a report by 
the parliamentary commissioner (ombudsperson) for fundamental rights repeatedly 
stated that the raids were considered to be intimidating, the provision of harassment 
was not actually used in the findings. Relying heavily on the ombuds-report, the 
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union successfully argued the case at court. The 57-page-
long landmark anti-discrimination decision issued by the Miskolc Regional Court on 
2018 December 12 actually held that the authorities’ behavior amounted to 
harassment (and ordered the city of Miskolc to pay app. 33000 Euros to charity 
working on desegregation and social work.) The court focused special attention on the 
adjacent communication on behalf of the local government, finding exclusionary, 
racist statements, which were also found to amount to (discriminatory) harassment. 
Harassment has also been applied by the Budapest Court of Appeal in 2014 
declaring that the practice of the police repeatedly banning Gay Pride March amounts 
to institutional harassment. The court declared that the Metropolitan Police 
committed direct discrimination and harassment based on sexual orientation in 2012 
when they banned the march claiming it disrupted traffic in Budapest. In previous 
years, the police consistently issued similar bans, and all have been overruled by the 
court, not to mention that various other events were permitted with roughly the same 
routes with significantly more participants. (One of these was a GONGO-march 
partially financed by the government with more than a hundredfold number of 
participants.) The trial court found that the police engaged in harassment, because 
their decision led to the creation and strengthening of a hostile, degrading and 
humiliating environment for a group of people with regard to their sexual orientation, 
and such practices can increase homophobia (Háttér, 2014). 
Another set of cases concerned hate speech by local politicians. Before 2012, 
the coming into force of the new constitution (and subsequent criminal and civil 
legislation), the significance of these strategic lawsuits was that according to the 
Constitutional Court neither criminal, nor civil law provided adequate measures to 
combat racist hate speech.
2
 Even though not all cases led to victory, the Equal 
Treatment Authority (ETA), Hungary’s equality body and the courts had no 
conceptual problems with considering this approach to invoke harassment.  
The first notable case concerned racist hate speech by the mayor of a small 
town, Edelény. At the public meeting of the city council in 2009 that was broadcasted 
on the city television, Mayor Oszkár Molnár made the following statement: 
It is no secret that in the neighboring villages where mostly the Roma live, for 
example in Lak and Szendrőlád, pregnant women deliberately take pills to give 
birth to loony children so that they can claim double the amount of social 
                                                        
2
 30/1992. (V. 26.) AB határozat, ABH 1992; 36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB határozat, ABH 1994; 
18/2004. (V. 25.) AB határozat, ABH 2004; 95/2008. (VII. 3.) AB határozat, ABH 2008; 
96/2008. (VII. 3.) AB határozat, ABH 2008. In 2008 the specialized ombudsman for minority 
rights, a pioneer advocate for the cause, prepared a – never adopted – draft-legislation 
expanding the scope of harassment explicitly to hate speech: A kisebbségi biztos javaslata a 
gyűlöletbeszéd elleni fellépésre, Fundamentum 12(2): 125–127 (2008). 
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benefits and that during the pregnancy – this is new information, but I have 
checked it, it’s true – women beat their stomachs with rubber hammers so that 
they would have handicapped children […]. 
 
The statement was repeated several times in the media, it was made public on the 
video news website of the national television channel RTL Klub and could be viewed 
on YouTube. The ETA found it to be a harassment of Roma mothers and pregnant 
women (EBH/1475/2009). On repeated appeal, the Supreme Court overruled this 
decision on the grounds that even if the mayor’s statements constitute harassment 
(which it did not rule out), there is a procedural obstacle as the statements were not 
made with reference to the residents of the local municipality, and the mayor can only 
be held responsible for discrimination in relation to them. 
In 2011 the Supreme Court passed a similar review of a decision of the Equal 
Treatment Authority (Kfv.III.39.302/2010/8).
 
The case was the following: After the 
violent death of the 14-year-old Nóra Horák in 2008 there was strong hostility against 
the Roma among the locals in the town of Kiskunlacháza. The city council organized a 
meeting with the title ‘Demonstration for life against violence’ where Mayor József 
Répás said the following:  
The rapists, the thieves, the murderers should be frightened! There is no place 
for violence in Kiskunlacháza, there is no place for criminals, we have had 
enough of the Roma violence! Kiskunlacháza and Hungary belong to the 
peaceful and law-abiding citizens. We will no longer let them steal our 
belongings, beat up the elders and deflower the children. We are still in 
majority. 
 
According to the ETA, the statement caused significant fear in the Roma, because the 
mayor’s words increased the already present hostility. The mayor published an article 
in the local newspaper of the city council with the title ‘We have had enough!’ that was 
published in one of the national daily newspapers. In the article, he stated that 
[s]everal brutal crimes have been revealed that had been committed by 
perpetrators with verified Roma origin. Still, the leftist, liberal media and the 
government talks about racism […] I am sorry to say that today there is an 
institutionalized racism against Hungarians in Hungary. […]  We must stop the 
terrorizing of the society, the deliberate creation of fear. We cannot let people 
hide behind the mask of minority and enjoy more rights than the majority. The 
basis of a normal society is that people feel safe. It should be a world in which if 
I leave my home in the evening, later I arrive home safely, and not in a body 
bag. 
 
Based on the petition of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee the ETA found that the 
mayor violated the principle of equal treatment with regard to the Roma residents of 
the town and committed harassment (EBH/187/1/2010). The Supreme Court, again, 
refused to recognize the scope of the antidiscrimination law. However, in retrial, the 
Budapest-Capital Administrative and Labour Court stated that the speech and writings 
of the mayor do not fall under the freedom of expression and constitute unlawful 
conduct (Helsinki, 2014). 
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In 2015 the Hungarian Helsinki Committee initiated a lawsuit against Budapest 
8th District City Council and Mayor Máté Kocsis because of the harassment of 
refugees who had come to Hungary. The mayor made a rudely generalizing and 
inflammatory post public on Facebook. Mr. Kocsis wrote that  
[o]ur recently renewed Pope John Paul II Square has been completely 
destroyed by the migrants. They have built tents and fires in the park, they 
throw away their litter, run around madly, they knife people and destroy things. 
Never has there been so much human excrement in a public space. […] We 
will protect the public property and we will guarantee the safety of our citizens 
with all legally available means. 
 
According to the plaintiff, the majority of the statements were unfounded and 
inflammatory, capable of inciting hostile emotions, talking about not individual 
refugees, but generalizing the statements, stigmatizing all migrants regardless of their 
individual behaviour and attitude, picturing them as threats to Hungarian society, 
thereby detracting their social assessment. The Facebook post clearly violates the 
obligation of public authorities to provide equal treatment. When assessing whether 
the behaviour of the defendant led to the creation of an intimidating, hostile and 
degrading environment one must take into consideration the already extremely hostile 
public attitude against migrants that was proved by the atrocities against asylum 
seekers, the people helping them or the people who were believed to be refugees. In 
2016 the Regional Court of Budapest Capital (P.22.427/2016/10), not contesting the 
applicability of harassment, rejected the petition on procedural grounds, arguing the 
city council’s relationship to the asylum-seekers does not fall within the scope of the 
anti-discrimination act. As of October 2018, the case is on retrial and pending. 
Also in 2016 in another lawsuit initiated by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union 
(HCLU) the ETA found that János Majoros, the mayor of Mezőkeresztes committed 
an act of harassment against the Roma with his public letter published in the July 2015 
issue of the local newspaper (EBH/459/5/2016). The article of the title was ‘Let’s stop 
the decrease of real estate prices’ and the mayor named two reasons for the decrease. 
One was that people with no income managed to acquire properties in the town and 
they sub-let these, the other that buyers of the real estates who were paying in 
instalments did not pay the full amount of the price. Two paragraphs later the mayor 
suggested a solution to the problem and asked the people of the town that if they 
could, they should not sell their properties to persons of Roma origin. The public 
letter was also published on the website of the city council. According to the ETA ‘the 
mayor’s warning, that people should not sell their properties to Roma people is in 
itself degrading and violates their human dignity, but in its context the warning can 
create a hostile, offending and humiliating environment for the Roma’ (HCLU, 2016). 
There was also an ombudsman report (AJB-703/2017) in the same case coming to 
similar conclusions. 
Möschel (2019) points to two Italian cases. The first involved politicians’ 
statements and posters from the Lega Nord and Silvio Berlusconi’s party, which 
warned against voting for a certain candidate in Milan’s mayoral elections because he 
would transform that city into a ‘gypsy-town’ and into Europe’s largest mosque. 
Following NGO litigation, the court (Tribunale di Milano, Sezione I civile, 26 May 
2012, no. 34318/11.) found racial harassment with regard to the comment about 
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Roma (but not concerning the mosque). In another actio popularis case against the 
local branch of the Lega Nord of a small Northern Italian town, Saronno, statements 
contained on seventy posters hung up in the municipal territory claiming that the town 
did not want to any illegal immigrants while the government organizes an invasion, the 
Milan Tribunal rejected discrimination claims (due to the restricted personal scope of 
the law), but held that the statements were clearly very offensive and humiliating and 
not only had the effect of violating the dignity of foreigners, asylum applicants and 
people having a different ethnicity than Italian citizens but also favoured a hostile and 
intimidating climate against them (Tribunale di Milano, Sezione I civile, 22 February 
2017, no. 47117/2016.) 
Recognizing hate speech as a form of harassment is not unprecedented in other 
jurisdictions. Schindlauer (2018: 84–85) points to three Bulgarian cases. In the first, 
Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Demographic Policy Valeri Simeonov, who 
also served as the Chair of the National Council for Cooperation on Ethnic and 
Integration Issues was found to be guilty of harassment by the Burgas District Court 
(K. B. and O. I. vs Valeri Simeonov, Decision No. 1151, case No. 7094/2016, 31 July 
2016), after stating in the National Assembly in 2014 that ‘[i]t is an undeniable fact that 
a large part of the gypsy ethnicity lives outside of any laws, rules and general human 
norms of behaviour.’ The Supreme Administrative Court similarly established 
harassment in 2017 (N.A. vs Mediapool Ltd.; Decision No. 2171, case No. 
12401/2015, 21 February 2017) when an online news portal failed to delete anti-
Turkish hate speech comments for an entire month, and in a 2019 judgment as well, 
when a national TV company having failed to moderate anti-Roma hate comments on 
its website (NN vs NN Decision No. 13542, case No. 10756/2015, 12 December 
2016).  
Returning to Hungary, another significant decision, targeting different social 
phenomenon, by the Curia, the supreme court of Hungary (Pfv.IV.21.274/2016/4) 
concerned litigation initiated by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, arguing that the 
failure of the police to dissolve marches organized by far-right paramilitary 
organizations in the Roma-inhabited part of the town of Gyöngyöspata amounted to 
harassment. (This case too was based on a report of the ombudsman.) 
Conceptualizing the lack of appropriate law enforcement action as a form of 
discrimination is in line with the European Court of Human Rights’ practice in seeing 
under-policing of hate crimes as a form of discrimination (although harassment is not 
used in the decisions, see for example Balázs v. Hungary [Application no. 15529/12, 
20 October 2015], R. B. v. Hungary [Application no. 64602/12, 12 April 2016], 
Király and Dömötör v. Hungary [Application no. 10851/13, 17 January 2017]).3 In the 
Balázs case the Court pointed out that treating racially induced violence and brutality 
on an equal footing with cases that have no racist overtones turns a blind eye to the 
specific nature of acts which are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. A 
failure to make a distinction in the way in which situations that are essentially different 
are handled may constitute discrimination, that is, unjustified treatment irreconcilable 
                                                        
3
 The third-party intervener, the European Roma Rights Centre submitted that this was a case 
of institutional racism against Roma within the State bodies, evidenced by the failure of the 
authorities to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their 
colour, culture, or ethnic origin. 
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with Article 14 of the Convention. The vigour and impartiality required for the 
investigation of attacks with potential racial overtones is needed because States have to 
continuously reassert society’s condemnation of racism in order to maintain the 
confidence of minorities in the ability of the authorities to protect them from the 
threat of racist violence. Furthermore, when it comes to offences committed to the 
detriment of members of particularly vulnerable groups, vigorous investigation is 
required.
4
 In the Gyöngyöspata case, while the high court rejected harassment-
arguments regarding ethnic profiling of Roma in stop and search practice, it did accept 
the under-policing claims and ruled that such practices amount to discrimination in 
the form of harassment.  
In another noteworthy case, the administrative court rejected appeals 
(6.K.31.719/2017/14) against the ruling of the equality body where it held that the city 
council of the town Tiszavasvári was guilty of harassment when it signed an agreement 
and cooperated in organizing marches with a far-right paramilitary organisation to 
‘regulate’ its Roma population. 
 
3. Assessing harassment: conceptual peculiarities, practical limitations, 
procedural risks 
 
So far I have shown that an activist interpretation of harassment may use it as a tool to 
broaden the scope of anti-discrimination protections to include a number of complex 
inequalities involving all sorts of discrimination in terms of grounds and protected 
characteristics (such as race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, social status, class, etc.). 
This second part of the article argues that while harassment may indeed be a 
useful and unique tool to tackle institutional discrimination, it is not a panacea for all 
forms of discrimination and social injustice, because (i) its scope and application 
terrain is inherently limited (as not every form of institutional discrimination can be 
conceptualized as harassment, not every form of discriminatory harassment will lead 
to institutional discrimination, and not every form of harassment amounts to 
discrimination); (ii) the very concept of harassment as it encompasses and blends 
criminal, labour and antidiscrimination law dimensions is not entirely uncontroversial; 
and (iii) the uniqueness of its operational principle relying on subjectivity also carries 
risks. Hence, the second part of the article focuses on the limitations and 
controversies involved with the concept of harassment. While earlier discussions 
                                                        
4
 The Court held that for the investigation to be regarded as ‘effective’, it should in principle be 
capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and 
punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but one of means; the 
authorities must have taken all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence 
concerning the incident. When investigating violent incidents, State authorities have the 
additional duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask any racist motive and to establish 
whether or not ethnic hatred or prejudice may have played a role in the events. This obligation 
to investigate possible racist overtones to a violent act is an obligation to use best endeavours 
and is not absolute. The authorities, however, must do what is reasonable in the circumstances 
to collect and secure the evidence, explore all practical means of discovering the truth and 
deliver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting suspicious facts that 
may be indicative of racially induced violence. 
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involved a diverse set of grounds for discrimination, the subsequent analysis focuses 
on cases involving gender-based (sexual) discrimination. The case of sexual 
harassment is arguably special and particular for several reasons: (i) the way how the 
blending of criminal, labour and anti-discriminatory conceptualization of harassment 
are operationalized in legal practice in this field has not (yet) been applied in other 
fields involving other grounds of discrimination. Also, (ii) socio-political develop-
ments, such as the #MeToo movement put sexual harassment in the centre of public 
discussion, also accentuating the potential dangers and occasional backlashes in legal 
practice. Furthermore, a prominent and widely publicized field of sexual harassment 
case law relates to a very particular area, American higher education institutions, 
which arguably can leave faculty and students without adequate legal protection.  
Despite this atypical nature of sexual harassment (which carries the danger of 
reducing and monopolizing discussions) it is still a useful case to demonstrate the 
complexities of the legal concept of harassment, as it has been the leading example of 
how dignity, equality, and identity claims are bridged and blended, which is a general 
and unique defining feature of harassment. Let us now turn to the discussion of these 
issues. 
 
3.1 Harassment and institutional discrimination: inherent and implied 
limitations 
 
The previous pages have argued that harassment can serve as a unique tool to counter 
various forms of exclusion and social inequalities, cases of institutional discrimination 
in particular, which would not easily be covered by the classic, ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ 
forms of discrimination. This nevertheless does not cover all forms of discrimination-
related injustice for the following obvious reason: besides (i) cases where 
institutionalized discrimination is harassment; (ii) there are forms of institutionalized 
discrimination that cannot be conceptualized and operationalized as harassment; and 
(iii) there are various forms harassment that amount to discrimination, but not 
institutional discrimination; and (iv) there are also forms harassment that are not 
discriminatory. 
The previous section brought examples for successfully argued cases for (i), and 
as a thought experiment we can extend the list of potentially successful similar cases 
where there is direct personalized emotional harm petitioners can argue to have been 
induced by identifiable agents in direct interaction with them. Consider judges sitting 
in courts treating marginalized defendants in a degrading manner; non-inclusive 
practices in cafeteria offerings (not providing Halal or Kosher food) in schools or 
prisons (where going out or ordering in is not an option); allowing to display, or in 
other cases prohibiting religious symbols or clothing in certain public venues; or (in 
the light of American student-grievances) even not having trigger warnings and ‘safe 
spaces’ safeguarding from ‘microaggressions’ in the classroom.5 Intimidation in the 
educational context has also been claimed to be caused by instructors using slang or 
examples or exam questions that are unknown to students from certain 
socioeconomic or cultural backgrounds; holding office hours or scheduling significant 
                                                        
5
 These would include the prohibition of discriminatory language as well as hand gestures and 
other forms of intimidating disagreement. 
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learning opportunities or exams not only during religious holidays, but also at times 
commonly used for work-study jobs or athletic practice. 
It is not easy to distinguish these cases in a theoretically sound way from (ii), 
institutionalized discrimination that cannot be operationalized as harassment in the 
anti-discrimination legal logic and term. In some cases litigators would just either be 
in, or out of luck arguing for it. Harassment presupposes a certain litigable action, 
practice or behaviour which distinguishes it from ‘simple’ structural discrimination 
conceptually encoded in the workings of an institution. The more distant, indirect the 
attributable action and the general the harm will be, the more chances for a successful 
litigation will decrease. Also, it may be very difficult, sometimes even impossible to 
establish and measure personal harm caused by intimidation, fear and degradation. 
Hence, the following phenomena probably fall under the cluster of non-harassment 
institutional discrimination: the systematic under-qualification of hate crimes (when 
the investigation and the indictment is based on less serious charges); residential or 
educational segregation (including the case when Roma children are classified as 
students with special needs, or when standardized tests that are used for classification 
contain racial or ethno-cultural bias); the legal framework that engages in (racially 
discriminatory) gerrymandering and enables abuse (in the form of ethno-corruption) 
in electoral law (see, for example, Pap, 2017); the well-documented instances of the 
displacement of Roma children from their families to state care; when the organizers 
of academic events set up ‘manels’ (panels consisting only of males); the negative 
media representation of minorities, etc. The ever-long list of bias encoded in 
legislation, be it direct or embedded in terminology in a subtle way also belong here 
and to bring examples from a variety of jurisdictions, it can arguably include rules on 
jury selection; three-strikes- and drug laws; sentencing guidelines; custody decision 
patterns (including the accumulation of child support debts for incarcerated African 
American males); the cis-heterosexual conceptualization of marriage; citizenship laws 
irregularizing certain populations; the legal acceptance of prostitution; culturally biased 
public holiday-policies, etc. One may even bring here an insensitive approach in 
memory politics, the way how history in books is represented, or the lack of reflection 
on certain authors’ involvement with slavery, the holocaust, but also not renaming 
street names, college buildings, fraternities, sports clubs or removing monuments and 
statutes for similar reasons. The use of historical flags such as the American 
confederate (Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, 576 U.S. 
[2015]) or the Hungarian ‘Árpád stripes’ (reminiscent of the Hungarian Arrow Cross 
Party of 1944–45 and therefore having fascist connotations) can arguably be 
intimidating, offensive and degrading for certain groups of the population, but it would 
likely be difficult to litigate such cases. 
As for (iii), non-institutional discrimination harassment, here the criteria is that 
discrimination is committed by a particular action and not a general pattern or 
operational mechanism. Besides ‘classic’ sexual harassment or bullying, this could 
include the case one of my colleagues told me about, when a Roma plaintiff made a 
complaint for a hate crime and the police officer who recorded the complaint was 
wearing a T-shirt with the inscription of a music band that can be connected to 
extreme right organizations. I believe that the criterion for creating a humiliating, 
degrading environment was also fulfilled by the poster campaign of the Hungarian 
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government in 2015 against migrants – who were, in reality, mostly refugees and 
asylum seekers. 
The Handbook on European non-discrimination law, published by the EU’s 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) in 2018 brings a number of further examples 
(FRA, 2018: ch. 2.4). Such was the case before the Hungarian Equal Treatment 
Authority, where a complaint was made about teachers who threatened Roma 
students that their misbehaviour at school will be notified to the ‘Hungarian Guard’, a 
paramilitary far-right organization. It was found that the teachers had implicitly 
endorsed the racist views of the Guard and created a climate of fear and intimidation, 
amounting to harassment (EBH/654/2009, cf. FRA, 2018: 66–67). In 2012 the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights issued its judgment in the case of 
Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia (nos. 43370/04, 8252/05, and 18454/06) in 
a case concerning Moldovan nationals living in the Moldovan Republic of 
Transdniestria (MRT), a separatist entity that split from the Republic of Moldova in 
1990 but that has not been recognized by the international community, ruling for the 
applicants who claimed that the MRT’s prohibition of using Latin scripts in education, 
and allowing a systematic campaign of vandalism in the school, along with arresting 
and profiling protesting parents and threatening them with the loss of their jobs and 
parental rights amounted to a systematic campaign of harassment and intimidation of 
those participating in schools using Moldovan as the language of instruction. A 
separate, repeated discussion is needed to discuss (iv) the scenario where the legal 
term and concept of harassment is used to sanction behaviour that is not actually 
discrimination. 
 
3.2 Harassment and discrimination: overlapping but not interchangeable; 
bridging dignity, identity and equality claims 
 
The conceptual peculiarity of harassment is twofold. As described above it blends 
transgressions sanctioned by three different fields of law: criminal, anti-discrimination 
and employment law when employees face disciplinary proceedings based on 
allegations of (mostly, but not necessarily limited to) sexual harassment, following 
internal guidelines or policy decisions that are only indirectly connected to or based 
on legislative frameworks. 
The second uniqueness of harassment relates to the complexity of the 
relationship between identity, equality and dignity claims and policies, and the way in 
which law conceptualizes and merges the three (and this is also intertwined with the 
intricate relationship between identity recognition and identity politics: the politics of 
recognition targeting cultural and symbolic injustice and identity politics). This feature 
of harassment is an attributable to legislative developments pertaining to gender and 
sexual harassment in particular but there is no legal indication that it would not be a 
generally applicable feature of harassment irrespective of the ground (i.e. the 
protected personality trait or characteristic).  
Fraser (2000) shows how, at least in the case of gender, equality includes both 
recognition and redistribution (thus: equality) claims, and in political (and often legal) 
discourses (even concerning discrimination) there is a shift from equality to dignity, 
and, confusingly often also an uncritical, unreflected and unexplored blending of the 
two. What we actually see here is an interesting back-and-forth bouncing, rondo-like 
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recognition of these commitments. Since Catherine McKinnon’s (1979) seminal work 
in the 1970s, it has been widely recognized that that dignity harm can be 
conceptualized as a form of discrimination, and by the 1990s in Europe several 
legislative documents formally recognized and acknowledged this link, in particular in 
the context of gender based discrimination and sexual harassment. A 1991 
Recommendation by the European Commission on the protection of the dignity of 
women and men at work (Commission Recommendation 92/131/EEC of 27 
November 1991) held that  
sexual harassment means unwanted conduct of a sexual nature, or other 
conduct based on sex affecting the dignity of women and men at work. This can 
include unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct. […] It is 
unacceptable if such conduct is unwanted, unreasonable and offensive to the 
recipient; […] and/or […] creates an intimidating, hostile or humiliating working 
environment for the recipient. […] Sexual attention becomes sexual harassment 
if it is persisted in once it has been made clear that it is regarded by the 
recipient as offensive, although one incident of harassment may constitute 
sexual harassment if sufficiently serious. […] conduct of a sexual nature, or 
other conduct based on sex affecting the dignity of women and men at work, 
including conduct of superiors and colleagues, is unacceptable if […] creates an 
intimidating, hostile or humiliating work environment for the recipient; and that 
such conduct may, in certain circumstances, be contrary to the principle of 
equal treatment. 
 
As we can see, here the language links dignity harms with the concept of 
discrimination, although not unconditionally, as it uses terms like ‘can’ or ‘in certain 
circumstances.’ Nevertheless, the link and connection between dignity and equality, 
incentivized and inspired by sexual harassment legislation, has become a standard 
form discrimination for all protected characteristics. (Note that the cited EU law 
definition for racial harassment was only adopted in 2000).  
This subsection highlighted the first conceptual peculiarity of harassment: its 
extreme complexity. Not only does it include and blend sanctions from three different 
areas of law, but the harms it targets and aims to remedy are also very diverse and 
different.  
 
3.3 Harassment and subjectivity: inherent risks 
 
The other conceptual peculiarity of harassment concerns how it operationalizes 
subjectivity in legal conceptualization in a unique fashion. It is quite atypical, and 
certainly challenging for legal procedures to incorporate subjective feelings. While it is 
a powerful and empowering tool for victims and members of marginalized 
communities to seek remedies in regards of an intimidating and humiliating 
environment, without proper guidelines for legal standards and procedures, the 
reliance on subjectivity is not without risks. Hence, if a petitioner can assume standing, 
that is, a protected personality trait or characteristic in relation to which harassment 
charges can be brought (and for which in several instances of anti-discrimination 
legislation there is an open-ended list), it is a daunting task for the judiciary and 
equality bodies to set up standards and due process/fair trial guarantees. It can, 
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however, lead to lawlessness if there are no constraints to sanctioning based on 
declarations of feelings. 
For comparison, in asylum law, standards have been developed to ascertain and 
operationalize objective standards for ‘well founded-ness’ in its central concept of ‘well 
founded fear of persecution’ – on the basis of which refugee status should be granted. 
Here, there is an intricate system of ‘objective’, pre-established country-specific fear 
(that is: persecution)-factors, on the basis of which the subjective feeling of fear from 
persecution can be established. The asylum-seeker will make a claim and recipient 
authorities will carry out a validation procedure, first establishing whether the group in 
question is actually in danger of persecution, and second, whether the claimant is a 
member of the group. The production and reception of the refugee legal narrative is a 
complex phenomenon involving several narrators with sometimes conflicting stories 
and objectives (Zagor, 2014).  
Although the ‘hostile, intimidating environment’ conceptually relies on 
subjective standards, the law is not entirely silent on benchmarking. Referring to the 
case law of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, the FRA Handbook sets forth 
that for a ‘conduct to be considered as harassment, it should be perceived as excessive 
and open to criticism for a reasonable observer of normal sensitivity and in the same 
situation’ (FRA, 2018: 65). This seems to introduce some sort of objective standards. 
However, the definition continues, and softens the criteria: ‘the harasser does not have 
to intend to discredit the victim or deliberately impair the latter’s working conditions. 
It is sufficient that such reprehensible conduct, provided that it was committed 
intentionally, led objectively to such consequences’, i.e. that the employer felt this 
way.
6
 According to the FRA, for harassment, ‘there is no need for a comparator to 
prove it, as harassment in itself is wrong because of the form it takes (verbal, non-
verbal or physical abuse) and the potential effect it may have (violating human dignity)’ 
(FRA, 2018: 66). This ‘potentially occurring effect’ unfortunately is an utterly vague 
description, not helping in crystallizing legal standards. 
Having shown general peculiarities of the legal conceptualization of harassment, 
and also having noted the particular role gender-based discrimination played in the 
development of its current understanding, the prevalence and relevance of the 
#MeToo movement calls for a separate discussion on sexual harassment. The reasons 
for this are twofold: (i) sexual harassment provides a vivid example of the legal and 
political dangers, inherent in the concept of harassment, which stems from the 
blending of criminal, labour and anti-discriminatory frameworks. It is (ii) also special 
in the sense that in certain fields, in particular in American higher education cases, 
legal practice has been quite controversial and (iii) academic, legal and political 
                                                        
6
 The European Union Civil Service Tribunal held for example that an appraisal of the 
performance of an official made by a supervisor, even if critical, cannot as such be classified as 
harassment. Negative comments addressed to a member of staff do not thereby undermine his 
personality, dignity or integrity where they are formulated in measured terms and are not based 
on allegations that are unfair and lacking any connection with objective facts. It has also held 
that the refusal of annual leave in order to ensure the proper functioning of the service cannot, 
as such, be regarded as a manifestation of psychological harassment. Case T-11/03, Afari v. 
ECB, ECLI:EU:T:2004:77 and Joined Cases F 106/13 and F 25/14, DD v. European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), ECLI:EU:F:2016:205, cf. FRA (2018: 140). 
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discussions on this arguable backlash along the #MeToo movement put sexual 
harassment in the frontline of public debates. 
 
3.4  Sexual harassment: From American higher education to the #MeToo 
movement 
 
Sexual harassment-related cases, be they legal or ‘political/ethical’, are often complex 
and multilayered in the sense that they may involve a form of sexual violence (that is 
unpermitted or unwelcomed physical advances), yet sexual harassment also includes 
scenarios in which verbal or other non-physical utterances create the intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. Thus, it involves at least two 
types of conduct: one that has always been illegal, amounting to even criminal 
sanctioning in the case of rape, sexual assault or coerced sex, but it may also include 
speech that in a relatively short period of time became socially and politically 
unacceptable. Verbal harassment creating an intimidating environment mostly came 
up in American higher educational contexts, and mostly pertaining to gender identity 
or sexual orientation, but also in the context of race in the public and legal discourse. 
As we will see, the line between law and politics is often blurred, as charges for sexual 
harassment – even if unsubstantiated or confirmed by judicial proceedings, or often 
even by a mere police investigation – are sufficient reasons to terminate employment 
contracts. This essay concerns primarily the legal aspect of harassment claims and 
sanctioning. However, ceasing contracts in the media, the art world or publishing (see, 
for example, Alter, 2018) over allegations (and not findings or judicial rulings), which 
are triggered to save the reputation of the employers may have legal relevance in 
adjacent, indirectly related litigation. Hence ‘political correctness’, and its 
manifestation in ‘cultural appropriation’, the shadow of harassment allegations, or the 
failure to prevent retaliation and to create ‘safe places’ will carry property interest.  
The case of American higher education is not discussed here because the 
author would believe that academia is the most important or pervasive context 
(although few professionals are fully exempt from cognitive biases when it comes to 
their field). The overall impact of the #MeToo movement in Hollywood, or even in 
politics is much higher and much more visible. Most of these cases are, however, 
extra-legal in the sense, that contracts are being cancelled, nominations are being 
withdrawn, resignations are handed in without formal legal procedures. The 
importance of higher education cases lies in the fact that here the endurance of law is 
tested within social, cultural and political developments. 
The legal, constitutional and policy ramification of sexual harassment 
procedures will therefore be intricate and robust. The following questions require 
special attention: 
First, there is a conceptual and terminological inconsistency in the legal 
provision of harassment as an anti-discrimination clause, which allows for melding 
verbal transgressions and minor, often culturally ambiguously coded physical advances 
with criminally sanctionable rape and sexual assault. Kipnis (2015a) points for 
example to the, in her account troubling, terminology of referring to rape victims as 
survivors, a term previously reserved for holocaust victims. Echoing her assessment of 
a ‘panicky conflation’ where ‘gropers become rapists’, Julia Hartley-Brewer underlines 
the dangers of generalizations concerning ‘rape culture’ which is ‘characterised by a 
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“continuum of abuse” – running from locker-room banter to gang rape’ (Various 
Authors, 2017). 
In general, there is an inherent difficulty in striking a balance between due 
process requirements for the accused (harassers) and narrowly tailored commitments 
to combat secondary victimization and the subsequent chilling effect of silencing and 
non-reporting (see, for example, Cortina and Berdahl, 2008). 
Second, as Dobbin and Kalev (2018) show, the adversarial, law-based formal 
grievance systems are most often intrinsically inadequate for sexual harassment, as 
victims do not trust the process, they fear social and job-related retaliation,
7
 and formal 
complaints actually rarely lead to the removal of the harasser and the victims will 
continue to coexist in the same space. Also, in many cases victims are not interested in 
severe sanctioning, they mostly want the practice to stop. However, the non-legal 
sanction-based ombuds-type mediation, which employers are incentivized to follow to 
avoid high profile, public procedures and costly lawsuits, run the risk of depriving 
victims of legal remedies by forced private arbitration procedures (see the IBM and 
Uber cases and Fowler, 2018). 
Third, in a certain specific environment, such as higher education, the location 
of the most visible and widely discussed harassment cases, there is an inherent conflict 
between aspirations for an intimidation-free safe place, and academic freedom: which, 
besides free speech being a fundamental constitutional value and an individual right, is 
also a specific professional, educational value. It is the core of the free speech doctrine 
in all jurisdictions that up to a certain degree, and here the margin of appreciation is 
usually quite broad, even offensive, shocking speech should not be censored and 
outlawed. The required degree of tolerance for artistic and political speech varies 
depending on the manner, time and place of the speech, and for the workplace the 
standards may very well be more stringent. There are also certain exceptional content-
based limitations on free speech: it is a habitual practice to introduce (even criminal) 
sanctions on holocaust-denial, blasphemy, or the violation of other, specific, 
historically rooted sensitivities concerning the dignity of certain communities. One 
may argue that such exceptional protections need to include verbal sexual (or other 
protected characteristic-based) harassment. At this point, however, no straightforward 
judicial or political declarations for this type of exceptionalism have been set forth. 
Since, as mentioned above, the field of American higher education is arguably a 
visible frontline for harassment (legal, or para-legal) cases it is important to provide an 
overview of the legal and socio-political landscape. American universities have become 
the social and political laboratory where the delicate interplay between legal and 
political/cultural responses to changing attitudes and social practices (i.e. political 
correctness and the emergence of calls for trigger warnings and safe places from 
‘microaggressions’ and other forms of cultural insensitivity) surfaces. University related 
harassment cases have received the greatest attention (not only from the media, but 
also in terms of legal practice), and arguably, produced controversial cases and trends, 
and this was intrinsically connected with debates on the ‘snowflake’ generation’s 
peculiar role in the commercialized educational sector. True, in the past years higher 
education culture developed hypersensitivity against any form of an unwelcoming or 
                                                        
7
 A US federal survey indicated that 66 per cent experienced it, see Dobbin and Kalev (2018), 
quoting Cortina and Magley (2003). 
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intimidating environment, going well beyond prohibiting discriminatory language and 
actions.
8 
The legal background for higher educational sexual harassment cases in the US 
is Title IX of the Civil Rights Act, which states that ‘no person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance’. Title IX defines sexual harassment as ‘unwelcome 
conduct of a sexual nature’ as long as the behaviour is serious enough to impact the 
victim’s access to educational opportunities by creating a hostile environment. Facing 
federal and civil penalties, schools are required to conduct a ‘prompt, thorough, and 
impartial’ investigation into any allegation of sexual assault reported on campus. Thus, 
an originally antidiscrimination provision, following the interpretation that such 
conduct may create a hostile environment was expanded to investigate sexual assaults, 
issues that may include criminal behaviour falling under the competence of the police. 
It is important to note that these cases will typically involve alleged actual physical 
contact of some sort (and go beyond non-verbal intimidation). 
The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is the federal agency charged with enforcing 
federal antidiscrimination statutes, and in 2011, it issued an official correspondence 
(called Dear Colleague Letter (DCL)) regarding campus rape, which laid out the 
minimum grievance procedures by which schools must comply for cases involving 
sexual violence (Kirkpatrick, 2016).  
The DCL mandated that schools provide notice to students of the procedures 
and outcomes, perform adequate and impartial investigation into complaints, develop 
an equitable process in which parties have an equal opportunity to speak and present 
evidence, and ensure that the proceedings are facilitated by individuals who receive 
annual training on sexual violence issues. Other than these broad guidelines, the OCR 
fails to specify how schools should carry out these mandates. As a result, some schools 
are conducting such disciplinary hearings differently than others. (Kirkpatrick, 2016: 
165) 
As Kirkpatrick (2016: 165) points out, out of the nineteen-page document, a 
mere two sentences address due process rights for the accused. ‘The document even 
urges that steps to afford due process rights to the accused should not restrict or delay 
protections for the Complainant’ and ‘strongly discourages institutions from allowing 
the accused to cross-examine the complainant.’ Failing to comply, universities risk 
losing federal funding. Generally discouraging to pay too much attention to the due 
process rights of the accused, the DCL set forth the so called ‘preponderance of the 
evidence standard,’ used in civil cases, requiring (50.01 per cent certainty) to resolve 
sexual assault accusations. Using a higher burden of proof, such as a clear and 
convincing evidence standard, applied in criminal cases, the schools arguably would 
                                                        
8
 See for example accounts of Laura Kipnis arguing that feminism became hijacked by 
melodrama and students are committed to vulnerability and conditioned to infantilization, and 
that they have no agency in what happens to them, and anyone with a grudge, a political 
agenda, or a desire for attention can easily leverage the system. She argues that now emotional 
discomfort is regarded as equivalent to material injury (to be remediated) and the climate on 
campuses is so accusatory and sanctimonious and chilling that open conversations are 
practically impossible (Kipnis, 2015a; 2015b; 2017). 
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be in violation of Title IX. A typical hearing process may end in expelling students 
and firing professors, and as interim measures banning from campus (if they were 
living there, forcing them to move) and suspension (with or without pay). The 
disciplinary process is otherwise the same ‘that governs alleged violations of university 
codes of conduct, such as the plagiarism of a term paper or the theft of a roommate’s 
belongings’ (Kirkpatrick, 2016: 166). Most operate like courts, using a panel of 
decision makers who hear and weigh evidence, determine the facts, and decide 
sanctions. There is extensive but contradictory judicial practice on these procedures 
(following litigation contesting school decisions): universities are under no clear 
obligation to allow the accused to have legal counsel present, although they usually 
allow a fellow faculty member (called faculty counsel) to be present, and there is also 
no legal requirement to inform the accused students or faculty of the specific charges 
or the discovery of any evidence, and the right to cross-examine witnesses or the 
complainant is also not provided (Kirkpatrick, 2016: 167). 
Kirkpatrick (2016: 167) shows how, ‘courts even differ as to whether or not 
hearing committee members need to recuse themselves if they are familiar with the 
accused or complainant and have a conflict of interest’.9 In a typical sexual assault 
hearing, the university will first send notice of the charge to the accused and ask him 
or her to respond. The accused (and maybe but not always complainant) will then 
appear before a panel akin to a jury, which is typically comprised of disinterested 
tenured professors, sometimes along with students, faculty, and staff.  
Panels often use the same Title IX coordinator as investigator, prosecutor, 
defender, jury, and judge. […] In addition, the panels are made up of university 
employees who most likely have an innate interest in the claims […], as 
acquitting the accused student carries with it the threat of OCR costing colleges 
over half a billion dollars in federal funding. (Kirkpatrick, 2016: 172) 
 
Appeal is not always available, but most often there is a fairness hearing review 
committee, the decision of which then can be appealed to the President, and then 
Board of Trustees (but only) for procedural errors. 
It is a twist that in several cases faculty members can actually be sanctioned for 
retaliation, even if it merely involves an academic commentary on a case, be it even a 
mere tweet (see, for example, Smith 2003). Laura Kipnis of Northwestern University 
provides a broadly cited documentary of what she labels as a witch hunt against her by 
‘allowing intellectual disagreement to be redefined as retaliation’ (in particular 
attending disgraced philosophy professor Peter Ludlow’s dismissal hearing) (Kipnis, 
2015a; 2015b; 2017). 
In sum, students and professors can be expelled (with very slim chances or re-
employed in or able to transfer to another institution) without even a police report 
ever filed, by a committee the members of which are not impartial (due to their 
position) and actually lack any formal training in dealing with sexual misconduct, 
                                                        
9
 Citing, for example, Osteen v. Henley, 13 F. 3d 221 (7th Cir. 1993), Winnick v. Manning, 
460 R. 2d 545, 549 (2nd Cir. 1972), Dillon v. Pulaski County Special School District, 468 F. 
Supp. 54 (8th Cir. 2009). 
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effects of alcohol or even law (Kirkpatrick, 2016).
10
 And these judgments are passed 
not (only) for engaging in alleged physical interaction, but also for a mere 
commentary. Here and by this, the more general concept and conceptualization of 
harassment is revisited. 
In 2018 the Trump-administration projected that the 6000 colleges and 
universities conduct an average of 1.18, and the 17000 elementary and secondary 
schools 3.23 sexual harassment investigations annually (Green, 2018b). The 
Department of Education foreclosed a proposal to redefine federally regulated sexual 
harassment narrowing it down to ‘unwelcome conduct on the basis of sex that is so 
severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it denies a person access to the school’s 
education program or activity.’ The proposed rules would hold schools accountable 
only for formal complaints filed and for conduct said to have occurred on campus, 
and a higher legal standard to determine whether schools improperly addressed 
complaints would also be allowed, leaving it in the schools’ discretion to choose 
between ‘preponderance of evidence’ or ‘clear and convincing’ evidentiary standards. 
Secretary DeVos actually rescinded the 2011 DCL, assailing the guidelines as federal 
overreach that coerced schools into setting up quasi-judicial systems fraught with 
inconsistencies. The proposed rules would expand the accused perpetrators’ right to 
use mediation, request evidence and cross-examine.
11
 
It should be noted that the peculiarity of the higher education cases is not 
independent from how the business interests in this highly lucrative enterprise, where 
students are customers and consumer satisfaction is paramount, and avoiding 
classroom friction with unpopular is an existential necessity for adjuncts, instructors, 
and part-time faculty with renewable contracts, who make up a majority of teaching 
staff (Kipnis, 2015a). 
The alarming feature of the American cases is how the application of the 
(essentially legal) concept of harassment is applied in an extra-legal arena in 
terminating contracts, ending careers, etc. without due process findings and 
investigations by competent authorities. And this is where we revisit the terrain of 
politics in the (social) mediatized world, where social progress is often blurred by 
reductionism, and moral panic.  
Lídia Balogh (2017), for example, demonstrates how the European Parliament 
resolution of 26 October 2017 on combating sexual harassment and abuse in the EU 
(2017/2897(RSP)) provides a continental case for the moral panic-induced conceptual 
and terminological chaos: first, the European Parliament throughout the text 
repeatedly uncritically bundles non-criminal conduct such as harassment and other 
forms of discrimination, with rape, physical violence, forced marriage, female genital 
mutilation and honour crimes. Sexual harassment and sexual abuse are identified as 
forms of gender-based violence. Furthermore, as if a grievance competition would be 
at place, sexual harassment is identified as ‘the most extreme […] form of gender-
                                                        
10
 It also needs to be added that ‘[e]ven though most of these cases involve the voluntary 
consumption of alcohol, the accused male may not use it as a defense whereas the female 
complainant can escape scrutiny from it’ (Kirkpatrick, 2016: 164). 
11
 Cf. Green (2018a): ‘The Obama administration […] strongly discouraged parties from 
personally questioning each other during hearings, believing it would be “traumatic or 
intimidating, thereby possibly escalating or perpetuating a hostile environment”.’ 
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based discrimination.’ Also, the resolution indiscriminately ‘Welcomes initiatives such 
as the #MeToo movement that aim to report cases of sexual harassment and violence 
against women; strongly supports all the women and girls who have participated in the 
campaign, including those who denounced their perpetrators.’ Besides endorsing an 
informal movement (lacking identifiable agents) this unselective support for all women 
making accusations, in principle includes even fraudulent, malevolent ones, and 
hence, arguably is problematic. 
On a final note on sexual harassment and #MeToo, the occasional 
controversial use, or even as some argue, abuse in relation of sexual harassment can 
and should be seen as a necessary side effect or externality of the massive shift in how 
gender equality, gender roles, and the contours of social interaction changes in 
Western societies, which includes the recognition and rejection of certain deep 
running particular behavioural patterns.  
The detailed discussion of American sexual harassment cases in this article is 
prompted by several reasons. First, since sexual harassment (and this is the main 
message of the #MeToo movement) is so pervasive and systematic in many facets of 
the workplace that it may actually amount to institutional discrimination. Second, the 
#MeToo movement, as well as the arguable backlashes seem to dominate, if not 
monopolize public discussion and actually shifted attention from other areas of 
workplace related harassment. A third reason lies in the fact that although there are no 
reports of, or systemic fair trial concerns have been raised regarding harassment-
related legal practice applied with regard to other protected characteristics, there is no 
conceptual or textual gag rule that would limit potential backlashes to sexual 
harassment.  
Summing up this section, harassment is an exceptionally complex and 
multifaceted legal concept. It may be added, its uniqueness may prove to be its 
weakness as well, as it may potentially be self-limiting. If there are other feasible 
alternatives such as direct or indirect discrimination to build the cases on, it will be 
easier for counsels to argue their case in front of a judge – especially in continental 
jurisdictions, with less room for judicial activism and savour for abstract, theoretical 
argumentations. Although the above described institutional discrimination-targeting 
harassment cases are remarkable, and I believe in a global export-potential, we need 
to be aware of its limitations. Apparently, institutional discrimination is an important 
analytical category, but due to its theoretical and doctrinal complexity, its application 
in public policy planning is likely to be more successful than in human rights litigation. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
To conclude: harassment is a truly unique legal concept which binds dignity, equality 
and identity claims in a complex and unique fashion, encompassing sanctions for 
criminal, discriminatory and employment law transgressions, and conceptualizing and 
operationalizing subjectivity in a singular fashion. The article showed that the concept 
is no panacea for all forms of social injustice, and has several technical and conceptual 
limitations. However, the occasional controversial legal practice of sexual harassment 
(where fair trial procedures potentially lack guarantees) should not blind and 
monopolize discussion on this multifaceted analytic concept and a legal term, which 
can work as a unique tool to combat institutional discrimination in regards of a broad 
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range of protected characteristics in the legal, as well as the broader, political and 
cultural sense. While the #MeToo movement provides a vivid example for the latter, 
this article overall targeted the former.  
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